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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Analysis Function of the US-CERT Control Systems Security Center (CSSC) at the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has prepared this report to document cyber security incidentsa
for use by the CSSC. The description and analysis of incidents reported herein support three 
CSSC tasks: establishing a business case; increasing security awareness and private and 
corporate participation related to enhanced cyber security of control systems; and providing 
informational material to support model development and prioritize activities for CSSC. 
The stated mission of CSSC is to reduce vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber 
attack on control systems. As stated in the Incident Management Tool Requirements (August 
2005) “Vulnerability reduction is promoted by risk analysis that tracks actual risk, emphasizes 
high risk, determines risk reduction as a function of countermeasures, tracks increase of risk due 
to external influence, and measures success of the vulnerability reduction program.” 
Process control and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, with 
their reliance on proprietary networks and hardware, have long been considered immune to the 
network attacks that have wreaked so much havoc on corporate information systems. New 
research indicates this confidence is misplaced—the move to open standards such as Ethernet, 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, and Web technologies is allowing hackers to 
take advantage of the control industry’s unawareness. Much of the available information about 
cyber incidents represents a characterization as opposed to an analysis of events. The lack of 
good analyses reflects an overall weakness in reporting requirements as well as the fact that to 
date there have been very few serious cyber attacks on control systems. Most companies prefer 
not to share cyber attack incident data because of potential financial repercussions. Uniform 
reporting requirements will do much to make this information available to Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and others who require it.  
This report summarizes the rise in frequency of cyber attacks, describes the perpetrators, 
and identifies the means of attack. This type of analysis, when used in conjunction with 
vulnerability analyses, can be used to support a proactive approach to prevent cyber attacks. 
CSSC will use this document to evolve a standardized approach to incident reporting and 
analysis. This document will be updated as needed to record additional event analyses and 
insights regarding incident reporting.
This report represents 120 cyber security incidents documented in a number of sources, 
including: the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) Industrial Security Incident 
Database, the 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, the KEMA, Inc., Database, 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Energy Incident Database, the INL Cyber Incident 
Database, and other open-source data. The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism (MIPT) database was also interrogated but, interestingly, failed to yield any cyber 
attack incidents. 
a. Italicized terms are defined in the Glossary in Appendix A. 
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The results of this evaluation indicate that historical evidence provides insight into control 
system related incidents or failures; however, that the limited available information provides 
little support to future risk estimates. The documented case history shows that activity has 
increased significantly since 1988. The majority of incidents come from the Internet by way of 
opportunistic viruses, Trojans, and worms, but a surprisingly large number are directed acts of 
sabotage. A substantial number of confirmed, unconfirmed, and potential events that directly or 
potentially impact control systems worldwide are also identified. Twelve selected cyber incidents 
are presented at the end of this report as examples of the documented case studies (see 
Appendix B). 
Summary of Cyber Security Incidents 
One hundred and twenty cyber security incidents considered for this report were evaluated 
for type, origin, perpetrator, and motivation. The following list presents the analysis results 
representing the highest percentage entry in each area: 
x 42% of all incidences were conducted by means of mobile malware
x 61% of the perpetrators originated from external sources 
x 43% of perpetrators backgrounds were malware authors
x 43% had a motivational intention of malware infection.  
An example of additional detail regarding perpetrators accumulated across all 120 
incidents is presented in the following chart. 
Perpetrator
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
Malware author
Current employee
Hacker
Software vendor
Former employee
Current contractor
Agent of a foreign nation
Competitor
Unknown
As depicted, and at this time, the combination of insiders such as contractors, former 
employees, and current employees are responsible for less incidents than the malware authors 
vwho write spyware. Trojans and viruses generally use evolved methods to send exploit code 
across the internet or other networks. 
Assessing the consequences of industrial cyber attacks is not simply a case of assigning a 
financial value to an incident. Although there are obvious direct impacts that may be easily 
quantifiable financially (e.g., loss of production or damage to the plant), other consequences may 
be less obvious. For most companies, the impact on reputation, subsequently reflected in loss of 
stock value, is probably far more significant than the mere cost of a production outage. The 
impacts of health, safety, or environmental incidents could be highly detrimental to a company's 
brand image. Even impacts such as minor regulatory contraventions may in turn affect a 
company's reputation, thereby threatening their license to operate.
For most of the reported incidents, the contributors have been unable (or unwilling) to 
provide a financial measure of the impact of the industrial cyber attack. In fact, only 30% have 
provided such an estimate. However, even though the sample data is not large, it does seem 
significant that nearly 50% of reported incidents, where a financial impact estimate was given, 
led to sizeable financial losses (<$1M).  
Forty-one percent reported loss of production while 29% reported a loss of ability to view 
or control the plant. Fortunately, human impacts have been small, with only one unconfirmed 
report of loss of life. Overall, the reported incidents clearly show that the most likely 
consequences of industrial cyber attacks to date are loss of the ability to view and-or control the 
process or system, causing an increased reliance on emergency and safety systems.  
Traditional safety systems are independent of the main control system and generally 
considered highly reliable. However, the design trend is to base emergency systems on standard 
cyber technologies; thus, mirroring main control systems, even if not directly connected, this 
configuration increases the potential risk of common mode failure of both the main control 
system and its safety systems. Consequently, in the future, the systemic risks of cyber attack 
need to be considered in the design of not just the control systems, but also the safety systems.  
The cyber incidents reviewed to date suggest that the threat to national infrastructure is 
real, and that our national ability to anticipate, predict, and prepare against cyber attack will 
benefit greatly from national efforts to produce a more methodical approach to incident reporting 
and analysis. In some regard, review of the available incidents suggests trends similar to what is 
being experienced in the information technology world.  
The effort to evolve enhanced reporting and analysis methods needs to be a joint industry 
and government venture. Until such time as a formalized incident reporting structure and 
analysis paradigm can be finalized, a combination of the current U.S. Computer Emergency 
Response Team incident reporting requirements, in conjunction with other approaches such as 
those contained in the MIPT and BCIT, should be considered as an interim means of collecting 
and analyzing incident data. 
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1Cyber Incident Report for the
US-CERT Control Systems Security Center 
INTRODUCTION
This cyber incident report was prepared for the US-CERT Control Systems Security 
Center (CSSC) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). It will be used by CSSC as input to 
establishing a business case for increasing awareness and security within private and corporate 
entities and encourage their participation in developing a more methodical approach to cyber 
incident reporting and analysis. U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT) will use 
this document to evolve a standardized approach to incident reporting and analysis. Uniform 
reporting requirements will do much to make this information available to Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) staff that can then use this data to support and update the US-CERT 
national control system security strategy. When combined with vulnerability analyses, the 
strategy can then be used by DHS staff and industry to support a proactive approach to 
preventing cyber attacks.
2CYBER INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION 
A substantial number of confirmed, unconfirmed, and potential cyber incidents that 
directly or potentially impact control systems have been documented worldwide. As confirmed 
in this section, case histories show that cyber attacks have increased significantly since 1988. 
The majority of attacks come from the Internet by way of opportunistic viruses, Trojans, and 
worms, but a surprisingly large number are directed acts of sabotage. 
Database Searches 
In theory, control system security can be quantified in part by analyzing the past history of 
malicious attacks directed toward control systems. To this end, the following sources were 
evaluated:
x US-CERT Coordination Center (CERT®/CC)b
x Industrial Security Incident Database (ISID; British Columbia Institute of Technology 
[BCIT] proprietary) 
x Energy Incident Database 
x National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) http://www.mipt.org
x Process Control Cyber Security Forum http://www.pcscs.org/
x National Counterintelligence Center http://www.nacic.gov/
x Embedded systems failures 
http://www.theinternetfoundation.org/Notes/Y2K/EmbeddedFailures.htm
x Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) discussion list 
http://lists.iinet.net.au/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/scada
x SysAdmin, Audit, Network (SANS) Institute http://www.sans.org/
x 2003 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey 
x Kema, Inc. 
x Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) 
x Idaho National Laboratory (INL). 
These historical repositories were searched for evidence of terrorist attacks on control 
systems, including process control systems (PCSs), SCADA systems, and control systems. 
Approximately 450 physical attacks have been reported in the energy sector related to control 
systems, although few of these were consciously directed as attacks against a control system. 
Neither the MIPT nor CERT®/CC uses the labels “Process Control System,” “Control System,” 
b. CERT® and CERT Coordination Center® are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark office. Copyright 2005 
Carnegie Mellon University.
3“SCADA,” or variants thereof. One reason for this may be that, historically, so few incidents 
specifically involving a control system have occurred that the term was never used as a keyword 
in databases or reporting systems. Also, the existence of autonomous control systems in the past 
has prevented a convenient target for terrorist attack. Another reason could be that the required 
technical sophistication to carry out a cyber attack against a control system is much greater than 
other more accessible targets. However, considering the evolution of the Internet and 
pervasiveness of computers, history and voluntary reporting are not good indicators at this time. 
This study is also consistent with an observation made in the Process Control Systems Cyber 
Security Website, which quotes Pete Simpson from a March 12, 2003, article in Computer 
Weekly 360: 
“The U.S. Department of Energy and several private security companies 
have demonstrated the ability to obtain unauthorized access to control 
systems. There have been many electronic impacts of control systems. 
Most have been unintentional, though there have been some intentional 
cases. None of these incidents have been identified by CERT, SANS, or 
CSI as they do not have the expertise or contacts to obtain this 
information.” (http://www.pcscs.org/news.php)
The result of this database repository evaluation, provided in the following subsections, 
indicates that historical evidence provides insight into control system related incidents or 
failures; however, that the information provides little support to future risk estimates.  
CERT Coordination Center 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, warnings of the potential for terrorist 
cyber attacks against our infrastructures have increased. From 1995 to 2003, the United States 
CERT®/CC, the first computer security incident emergency response team, reported that security 
vulnerabilities resulting from software flaws increased from hundreds per year to more than 
4,000 per year. Along with these increasing vulnerabilities, the number of computer security 
incidents reported to the CERT®/CC has risen dramatically from 9,859 in 1999 to 82,409 in 
2002 and 137,529 in 2003. Although cyber incidents now exceed 100,000 per year, only a few 
damaging attacks on control systems have been documented, and of the 320,000 records, 
CERT®/CC reports only 13,000 vulnerabilities through 2003. It is difficult to say how 
conservative these numbers are however, because some attacks are not detected and some users, 
to protect their reputation or to avoid encouraging hackers, do not report incidents.
The following tables provide a breakdown of incidents by year from 1988 to 2003.  
1988–1989
Year 1988 1989 
Incidents 6 132 
41990–1999
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Incidents 252 406 773 1,334 2,340 2,412 2,573 2,134 3,734 9,859 
2000–2003
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Incidents 21,756 52,658 82,094 137,529
Total incidents reported (1988–2003) = 319,992
Figure 1 shows the cyber incidents detected and reported by third parties within the United 
States.
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Figure 1. Cyber incidents detected and reported to CERT®/CC by third parties within the U.S. 
Given the widespread use of automated attack tools, attacks against Internet-connected 
systems have become so commonplace that counts of the number of incidents reported provide 
little information with regard to assessing the scope and impact of attacks. Therefore, as of 2004, 
the number of incidents reported is no longer published.  
The database used by CERT®/CC to track these incidents is operated out of the Carnegie-
Mellon Institute. Although it contains a record of close to 320,000 cyber attacks (through 2003), 
essentially all apply to business information; no records of “process control systems” are 
mentioned.  
5Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism Database 
The MIPT (www.mipt.org) carries a RAND-produced database on terrorism events. This 
database includes only those events that meet the definition of terrorism set forth by the United 
States Federal Government in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (U.S. Code 2003). A total of 16,224 
incidents were recorded in the database between 1968 and May 2004. 
The MIPT database was searched for a variety of key words that would likely identify PCS 
or control system attacks, as shown in Table 1. In the database, attacks are categorized by 
weapon, but the word cyber is never used to describe a weapon.
Table 1. Control system-related terms in the MIPT database. 
Search Term Number of Hits 
Process 62 
Control 248 
Process control 3 
Remote 129 
Remote control 95 
Computer 23 
PCS 0 
SCADA 0 
Cyber 0 
Although “control” and “remote” appeared frequently, in no case were there references to 
control systems as used in this document. Review of three events using the term “process 
control” showed that the term was not related to “process control” as used in this document. The 
word control is generally associated with control of an object or a controlled explosion, as in 
“remote controlled” explosion, or such as physically taking control of a plane. The word remote 
is associated with either carrying out an act remotely or using a remote-control device that is part 
of a weapon used in a terrorist act. The word computer is associated with physical destruction of 
computers, theft of computers, or computer companies. There was no incident in the database 
involving the use of a computer as a vector to damage a facility or infrastructure or an attack on a 
business, industrial, or infrastructure computer. There were no instances of the use of the word 
“cyber.”
Energy Incident Database 
The Energy Incident Database is a proprietary database owned and maintained since 1974. 
Currently, the DOE Office of Intelligence must approve any release of information from this 
database for use by anyone other than themselves. The Energy Incident Database has records of 
approximately 200,000 incidents of all kinds, but is limited to incidents involving sub-national 
actors. A search of all incidents even remotely associated or potentially associated with control 
systems was conducted, including electrical control panels, switch gear, computers, control 
rooms, and so on. The search covered incidents associated with electrical power, oil and gas, 
coal, railroads, and seaports.
6The search identified 409 worldwide incidents between 1967 and May 2004. Most (98%) 
of these incidences involved physical attacks on a building, fenced area, or other structure that 
may have had a control system associated with it, but the attack was not focused on the control 
system (explosives tossed into a substation, rifle shots into switch gear, electrical switches 
thrown, and so on). Table 2 indicates the distribution of the 409 events by type—less than half 
involve sabotage or terrorism. Many of the recorded events were in foreign countries. Only nine 
incidents were identified as specifically relating to control rooms or SCADA systems involving 
computers and/or cyber attack. These incidents are identified by type and number of events in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Events in the Energy Incident Database by type. 
Category No. of Events 
Sabotage/terrorism 185 
Disgruntled or striking employees 119 
Vandalism/nuisance 57 
Test and maintenance error 22 
Fraud  12 
Manager/operator decision 4 
Equipment failure 3 
Military take-over 6 
Unknown 1 
Total 409 
SANS and CSI 
The SANS Institute tracks computer-related incidents similar to the Crime Screen 
Investigation/Federal Bureau of Investigation (CSI/FBI) Computer Crime and Security Survey. 
SANS is a leader in information technology (IT) security education and reports findings 
consistent with CSI/FBI surveys. The CSI/FBI 2003 Survey contains the same relevant 
information reported by SANS and, as such, was selected for review. No incidents related to 
PCS/SCADA were reported. 
Informal Process Control System Cyber Impact Database 
KEMA, Inc., has maintained an informal, but verified, database of cyber impacts on 
process control systems. They have recorded more than 60 real-world cases where control 
systems have been impacted by electronic means. These events have occurred in electric power 
control systems for transmission, distribution, generation (including fossil, gas turbine, and 
nuclear, where three plants experienced denial of service events), as well as control systems for 
water, oil and gas, chemicals, paper, and agribusinesses.  
Some of these events have resulted in damage. Confirmed damage from cyber intrusions 
have included intentionally opening valves resulting in discharge of millions of liters of sewage, 
opening breaker switches, tampering with boiler control settings resulting in shutdown of utility 
boilers, shutdown of combustion turbine power plants, and shutdown of industrial facilities. 
7Industrial Security Incident Database 
The ISID operated by the BCIT has been tracking cyber attacks on industrial control 
systems. The Industrial Security Incident Database contains 100 incidents over the past 20 years. 
Information Sharing Websites 
The following Web sites, documents, and discussion lists were searched by LLNL and INL 
for control-system-related cyber attacks, but none were identified. 
x Process Control Cyber Security Forum http://www.pcscs.org/
x National Counter Intelligence Center http://www.nacic.gov/
x Embedded Systems Failures 
http://www.theinternetfoundation.org/Notes/Y2K/EmbeddedFailures.htm
x SCADA discussion list http://lists.iinet.net.au/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/scada.
Database Search Results 
The database search activity identified 120 cyber incidents that the CSSC team could 
analyze. These incidents are located in a the BCIT ISID, KEMA Inc. database, LLNL, Energy 
Incident Database, INL cyber incident database, and in other open-source data (e.g., general 
internet searches, emails, etc.). Identifying and analyzing these reported incidents was a key 
activity in preparing this analysis.  
8CYBER INCIDENT ANALYSIS RESULTS 
This section summarizes the results of the analysis conducted on 120 cyber incidents 
located in the various databases described above. Analysis data is presented based on incident 
type, origin, perpetrator, and motivation of the attacker. 
Incident Type 
In an effort to obtain an accurate 
breakdown of the type of incident, the 
incidences were categorized as audit or pen 
test, misconfiguration, hack, or mobile
malware. Figure 2 displays the analysis results 
for the incident types considered in this study. 
Analysis results show that 42% of incidences 
were due to mobile malware, 28% to hack, 
26% to misconfiguration, and 3% to audit or 
pen test types. As depicted, mobile malware 
poses the largest activity risk. 
Perpetrator Origins 
In an effort to obtain an accurate 
breakdown of the perpetrators origin, the 
incidents were identified as external, internal, 
and unknown. Figure 3 displays the analysis 
results for the origin of perpetrators considered in 
this study. Analysis results show that 61% of 
perpetrators originated outside or external to the 
organization, 38% were internal, and the other 
1% was unknown. As depicted, external 
perpetrators pose the greatest risk. 
Perpetrator Background 
In an effort to obtain an accurate breakdown of the perpetrators background, the incidents 
were categorized as malware authors, current employees, hackers, software vendors, former 
employees, current contractors, agents of foreign nations, competitors, and unknowns.  
Figure 4 displays the analysis results for perpetrator backgrounds considered in this study. 
Analysis results show that 43% of perpetrators were malware authors, 23% were current 
employees, 15% were hackers, 6% were software vendors, 5 % were former employees, 5% 
were current contractors, and 4% were agents of a foreign nations, competitors, and unknowns, 
equally divided with 1%. As depicted, insiders such as contractors, former employees, and 
current employees pose less of a threat than malware authors who write spyware.
Mobile malware
42%
Hack
28%
Misconfiguration
26%
Audit or pen test
4%
Figure 2. Pie chart illustrating the percent of 
incident types. 
External
61%
Internal
38%
Unknown
1%
Figure 3. Pie chart illustrating the percentage 
of perpetrator origins. 
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Figure 4. Bar chart illustrating the percentage of perpetrator backgrounds. 
Motivational Intent of Attackers 
In an effort to obtain an accurate breakdown of the perpetrators motivational intent, the 
incidents were categorized as infecting malware, a result of user or administrator error, curiosity, 
personal, software error, audit or pen test, financial gain, information or electronic warfare, 
unknown and hacktivism.
Figure 5 displays the analysis results based on the motivational intent of attackers 
considered in this study. Analysis results show that the motivational intent of 43% of attackers 
was to infect malware, 20% the result of user or administrator error, 12% curiosity (malicious or 
otherwise), 10% personal, 6% software error, 4% audit or pen-test, 2% financial gain, 1% 
information or electronic warfare, 1% unknown, and 1% hacktivism. As depicted, the most 
common intent of the attacker was to infect malware. 
Motivation
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Malware infection
User or administrator error
Curiosity (malicious or otherwise)
Personal
Software error
Audit or pen test
Financial gain
Information or electronic warfare
Unknown
Hacktivism
Motivation
Figure 5. Bar chart illustrating the motivational intent of attackers. 
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Summary of Cyber Incidents 
The following list summarizes the analysis results of all cyber incidents considered for this 
report based on type, origin, perpetrator, and motivation of the attacker; the list gives the highest 
percentage entry in each area:  
x 42% of all incidences were conducted by means of mobile malware 
x 61% of the perpetrators originated from external sources 
x 43% of perpetrators backgrounds were malware authors  
x 43% had a motivational intention of malware infection. 
Further analysis suggests that a large percentage of incidents reported were due to a disgruntled 
employee who caused physical damage to the system. 
11
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS 
In the process of identifying and analyzing cyber security incidents—particularly as they 
relate to attacks on PCSs, SCADA systems, and control systems—the CSSC 2004 identified 
certain issues and concerns dealing with obstacles, risks and potential costs that felt needed to be 
addressed in order to increase industry awareness and security, and to reduce costs in private and 
corporate sectors of the nation. Our research confirms this notion. In their research they 
identified three main obstacles that are keeping private and corporate sectors from improving 
security measures: 
x Lack of awareness 
x Shortage of good analyses to draw from 
x Fear of financial repercussions. 
Lack of Awareness 
Process control and SCADA systems, with their reliance on proprietary networks and 
hardware, have long been considered immune to the network attacks that have wreaked so much 
havoc on corporate information systems. Recent research indicates this confidence is misplaced; 
the move to open standards such as Ethernet, Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP), and Web technologies is allowing hackers to take advantage of the control industry’s 
unawareness. This can be seen in the following examples of cyber incidents that have occurred in 
the recent past:  
x In August 2003, a worm infected the communication system of the U.S. railway company 
CSX Transportation. The dispatching and signaling systems were affected and all 
passenger and freight traffic, including morning commuter traffic in the Washington, D.C. 
area, had to be stopped for about 12 hours.1
x In January 2003, the “Slammer” worm disabled the computerized safety monitoring system 
at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio, which was shut down for repair at that 
time. The responsible managers considered the plant “secure,” as its outside network 
connection was protected by a firewall. The worm entered the plant network via a 
contractor’s infected computer that was connected via telephone dial-up directly to the 
plant network, thus bypassing the firewall.2,3
x In March 2000, a former consultant to waste water plant in Maroochy Shire, Queensland, 
Australia, accessed the control system of the plant and released up to 1 million liters of 
sewage into the surrounding waterways.4
x The Internet Engineering Lab of the British Columbia Institute of Technology has set up 
an industrial control system security incident tracking database, which, in the spring of 
2004, contained approximately 41 entries with a number of additional investigations 
pending.5
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These examples show that security vulnerabilities in industrial automation and 
communication systems are open to attack and pose a risk of financial damage for plant owners, 
as well as harm to humans and the environment. Industrial communication systems share some 
security-relevant characteristics with information and communication systems in the office and 
Internet domain, but they also exhibit major differences, which create both obstacles and 
advantages. For example, they have different protocols on communication links, different layers 
of security password protection, and different means of isolation for safety systems. 
In another example, from December 2002 to January 2003, a hacker or group of hackers 
gained unauthorized access to a modular hybrid controller resulting in a denial of service and 
loss of equipment control. There were two phases to the attack. First, hackers opened 
connections, sent unknown messages, and left without closing the connection. After repeated 
attacks, all connections were consumed resulting in a denial of service to legitimate users on the 
Ethernet port. Second, hackers sent a Web page to the controller containing Java script and the 
text: “Hello! Welcome to http://worm.com Hacked by Chinese.” This exposed a bug in the 
TCP/IP stack causing the controller to reset, forcing all outputs to their off state. Two controller 
vendor engineers worked full-time on the problem for three to four weeks each. Network activity 
was captured with a network analyzer. Once the causes were identified, the fixes were relatively 
easy. First, the controller’s software was modified to properly close all timeout connections. 
Second, the vendor of the TCP/IP stack software used in the controller was informed and 
provided a fix for the stack. 
This incident clearly demonstrates Web services being deployed directly on industrial 
controllers. Common practice is to include access to Web based services on most remote 
terminal units, programmable logic controllers (PLCs), and distributed collector systems sold 
today. According to a major manufacturer of PLCs,c the vast majority of their products are 
ordered with Web services enabled, particularly on their premium brands. However, a study by 
the same company’s marketing team indicated that only 13% of the users of this PLC actually 
configured and used the Web services. The remaining customers left the Web servers in the 
PLCs active with default passwords deployed.
Shortage of Good Analyses  
Much of the available information about cyber incidents represents a characterization as 
opposed to an analysis of events. This shortage of good analyses particularly in the area of 
human-systems interaction reflects an overall weakness in the availability of detailed data. 
Available data, in turn, reflect current reporting requirements. This obstacle has made it difficult 
for CSSC to obtain meaningful historical data related to cyber security incidents that can be used 
to support trending, quantification, and development of means to reduce the relative risk 
associated with cyber attacks.  
c. The name of this vendor is withheld by request. 
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Fear of Financial Repercussions 
Often, companies are not forthcoming about cyber attacks because of potential financial 
repercussions. This keeps them from reporting incidents that occur because they believe 
consumer confidence will decrease with each cyber-incident occurrence. Consequently, the 
confidential nature of cyber incidents makes it difficult to collect data and project future losses. 
Our study showed that cyber incidents within the business community are extensive and 
costly, with U.S. companies currently reporting unauthorized system access. Financial losses 
from these cyber incidents appear to be shared equally among denial of service, theft of private 
information, virus distribution, and other attacks. Some measures of the annual global financial 
impact of virus attacks alone, when taken over the period from 1995 to 2003, indicate a twenty 
to forty-fold increase.6
The annual cost in losses from major attacks has increased sharply since the mid-1990s. 
The estimates from sources are varied but in all cases report attacks in the billions of dollars The 
worldwide financial impact of viruses in 2003 was estimated to be almost $18 billion.6 Based on 
global losses of this magnitude, the Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction estimates that 
computer viruses cost between $1 and $2 billion in 2003. Ernst & Young’s 2003 Global
Information Security Survey7 reports that hackers, worms, and other high-tech interference 
caused $11.1 billion in damages in 2002, more than a twenty-fold increase since 1995. 
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RISKS AND RISK MITIGATION 
Cyber Incident Risks 
As confirmed in a recent survey, there are currently three main categories of significant 
cyber incident risks that affect companies: viruses, denial of services, and theft of proprietary 
information. These kind of cyber incidents accounted for 81% of losses experienced by industry 
within the United States in 2002.
A cyber incident that occurred in February 2000 demonstrates the extreme risks that cyber 
crimes pose to companies worldwide. This incident was caused by a 15-year old Montreal 
computer hacker who was responsible for 58 attacks and security breaches of Internet sites in 
Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Korea. Known as “Mafiaboy,” he launched a denial-of-
service attack that overloaded targeted Web sites with so much data that it completely shut each 
one down. Users were unable to gain access to these Web addresses for several hours.  
Companies affected by Mafiaboy included Yahoo!, eBay, Amazon, CNN, and the 
Microsoft network. By the nature of their business of Internet-related customers these companies 
serve requires them to be Internet-accessible at all times to conduct their business. His denial-of-
service attack disrupted Internet service periods ranging from 1 hour to more than 3 hours.  
Many companies accept a certain level of risk by relying primarily on the Internet for 
revenue. While many of these companies experience denial-of-service attacks, such strikes are 
often not reported to the police; instead, they are referred to as “glitches” so as not to deter 
customers from using their services in the future because of concern over security issues.  
Mafiaboy’s attacks on the Internet sites of Yahoo! and eBay resulted in a decrease in their 
stock values of between 17 and 23% in the weeks following the attack. Market reactions such as 
this demonstrate why companies are reluctant to disclose cyber attacks.  
Mitigating Risks and Losses 
As stated above, the objective of this report is to support DHS staff and industry in 
developing a proactive approach to preventing cyber attacks. Part of such an approach logically 
includes preventing or mitigating risks by exposing the needs and presenting solutions that can 
be used in developing a more methodical approach to incident reporting and analysis. These 
efforts will strengthen long-term abilities to anticipate, predict, and prepare against cyber attacks, 
not only in the United States, but also throughout the world. This report will increase awareness 
among industry leaders, recognizing that the full participation of such leaders will be critical in 
mitigating risks and minimizing losses. 
Many industry leaders are aware of these risks and have taken important initial steps to 
safeguard their assets, including prescriptive security rules and training of personnel to instill 
new practices and modify hardware and software used in business systems and plant floor 
controls. Some sector leaders are very active in securing their control systems, many others do 
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not see a compelling business case for investing in upgrades prior to normal changes driven by 
obsolete systems; thus, control system security is far from universal. Based on diminishing 
awareness, industry can therefore be categorized as follows: 
1. Those who are aware and actively protecting their own systems, but know that the supply 
and distribution networks or infrastructure they rely on are susceptible to malicious attack. 
2. Those who have current management support, but are doubtful of the needed long-term 
commitment for complete establishment and maintenance of their security needs. 
3. Those aware of problems or potential problems, but cannot convince management that the 
risk warrants investment in upgrades.  
4. Those who believe they are adequately aware, but think the risks to their systems are 
insignificant or that their relative obscurity produces security.
5. Those who are unaware to the risks associated with being connected to the Internet and 
using telecommunications and wireless communications. 
Human Factors 
The discipline of human factors generally refers to designing for human use.8 It has also 
come to mean the study of human capabilities and limitations, including human system 
interaction and design for reliable performance. Within the context of incident analysis, it 
represents the human aspect of the common vulnerabilities in control systems and the ability of 
the human to assist in mitigating damaging consequences. Although many incidents are the result 
of malware and malware attack several incidents are a direct result of human error, user or 
administrator error or curiosity. These incidents are identified in Database Search Results section 
of this document. 
Human Reliability and Human Factors as Crosscutting Issues 
The purpose of human reliability analysis (HRA) is to account for the human contribution 
to system risk. Within the context of control systems, human-influence extends to systems 
including administrative and financial systems as well as to the design, selection, and testing of 
physical systems. It also encompasses human response to and mitigation of cyber attack. 
There are typically three aspects to HRA: error identification, modeling, and 
quantification. Formal methods of HRA categorize errors according to a general human 
performance model.9 Human behavior has nominal error rates for routine actions and cognitively 
engaging tasks. These error rates apply to the failure of achieving desirable actions. HRA also 
helps to identify and quantify the risk contribution of undesirable actions. Thus, error rates are 
associated with both protecting and defending through the process of detection, diagnosis, and 
taking corrective actions, as well as activities maliciously undertaken to undermine a control 
system. The error rate is increased by clearly understood factors such as training, experience, 
workload, and stress. For example, a lack of training and experience coupled with high workload 
due to either the fast pace of events or the sheer number of things to be considered in conjunction 
with mental stress can greatly increase the human error probability. These same factors may also 
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contribute positively by decreasing the nominal error rate. Extensive training and experience 
coupled with good ergonomics, adequate systems feedback, good procedures, low workload, and 
a low level of stress will generally result in a decrease in the human error probability.  
As part of an overall control system risk model, calculating the human error probability 
makes it possible to model the overlap of the failure of human protective measures and the 
successful disruption of a control system by adversaries. Understanding this vulnerability space 
allows owners and operators to focus efforts in the design of secure systems, which can be made 
more secure by putting in place mechanisms to maximize human performance on the protective 
side, while simultaneously putting in place barriers to minimize offensive human actions. For 
example, forcing password changes on a regular basis acts as a way to increase system operator 
awareness of security, while effectively putting a roadblock in place to intrusion by unauthorized 
personnel.
Culture, including organizational culture, shapes human performance and human error. 
This is true for cyber attackers and system defenders. Culture is comprised of values, attitudes, 
and beliefs that have been shaped by a group of individuals over a period of time. Culture acts as 
a filter that influences perception, cognition, and action. Within control systems, there are 
attitudes and beliefs held by personnel that are unique to individual infrastructures and 
organizations that, in turn, can help to condition human-system response, even to the extent of 
doing things contrary to our intentions. For example, the culture of the professional hacker 
working for a nation state, versus a malware author frequenting a zero day room for inspiration 
may be quite different. The former may wish to extract information from the systems without 
attribution, the latter may wish to disable a system and do so as publicly as possible.
Predicting human performance and human reliability in response to a control system attack 
includes understanding important aspects of human-machine interaction. Influencing factors 
include the quality, clarity, and timeliness of the information that is present; staffing levels and 
staff skill levels; reporting requirements; an organizational culture that reinforces questioning 
attitudes; and the additional influences that can affect human response such as training, 
experience, workload, stress, complexity, and the quality of procedures. Pre-event, human errors 
in system-design, maintenance, and operation can also serve to make errors in response to the 
control system attack more likely.  
Human Reliability Analysis and Control Systems 
Human reliability and human factors in control systems are important parameters in 
determining the probability of success or failure for those actions and decisions assumed by 
designers and facility operators. Human factors insights can be used to assist in building physical 
and cyber defenses, and in detecting and diagnosing attacks. Proper attention to human factors 
can help to ensure that personnel follow appropriate procedures to restore systems and 
functionality, and alert the appropriate authorities. Knowledge of human factors and human 
reliability concepts can be used to strengthen the design of cyber security training and awareness, 
and ensure getting systems back online with the least amount of damage to property and human 
life. Currently, reporting requirements associated with events do not provide all the information 
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necessary to develop the proper sensitivity to human factor issues. Further, to get truly 
meaningful information people will have to feel free from retribution when reporting what has 
occurred during events. 
Some proactive actions can be taken immediately to enhance the current state of human 
performance in response to events. This could entail organizations recognizing that their 
unencrypted financial transactions are at risk to rogue monitoring and taking appropriate 
defensive actions, such as using encryption, implementing intrusion detection systems, and 
instituting an effective encryption and password policy. In food processing, it could mean that 
people have sufficient awareness of a terrorist threat to control systems and accordingly decide to 
isolate the control system from the Internet and set up additional means of preventing attack, 
such as two-person rules (shown as Separation of Duties) for changing temperature set points. 
Management and industry bear the responsibility to set up the appropriate infrastructure 
requirements. 
A review of Sandia findings in May 200310 provides ample evidence of the role of human 
factors across four out of the following five major control system vulnerability groupings: 
control system data, security administration, architecture, networks, and platforms.  
The first notable failure is in control system data. They indicate that failure to assign 
sensitivity levels for control system data is an overarching challenge that has led to fundamental 
problems in assessing whether the security of associated databases is appropriate. The other 
categories demonstrate additional problems. For example, 100% of the vulnerabilities in control 
system administration involve human factors or human error as is manifest in policy decisions 
regarding control systems, problems in procedure design or implementation, lack of formal 
security training, and lack of formal configuration management. Only control system architecture 
vulnerability is not ordinarily associated with human factors. Fifty percent of the common 
vulnerabilities in control system networks and 44% of the vulnerabilities in control system 
platforms involve human factors. Finally, the findings list miscellaneous cultural factors such as 
having blind faith in the ability of control system links to faithfully transmit data. These cultural 
human factors represent shortcomings in training and sensitivity related to control system 
security.
The current generation of reporting systems is weak in terms of reporting the human aspect 
of preparation and response to cyber attack. This is true do to aspects of trust as well as financial 
considerations and public perception. Once these are dealt with more successfully than presently 
is the case specific human factors information in a number of areas needs to be developed. Some 
of the more important for reporting include the following: number, level and skill of personnel 
responding to the attack; better characterization of perpetrator parameters, whether or not 
security procedures are implemented and enforced, identification of successful and unsuccessful 
actions, whether security checks proved effective, etc. Research can be focused on the design of 
these reporting requirements from a human factors perspective. 
The decisions and actions that people take determine much of control system response to 
cyber attack. Although generic awareness is useful, potential success of these actions are context 
specific to infrastructure and to application. The only way to increase our knowledge of what 
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works and doesn’t work is through the collection and analysis of event-based data. Industry 
groups are developing standards for the protection of control systems across infrastructures. This 
needs to be informed by the analysis of cyber events that can form a basis for next generation 
reporting requirements. This information has to be made available in such a way that sectors can 
properly employ control system standards and share their success without placing proprietary 
and trade information at risk or creating additional vulnerabilities. 
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DOCUMENT MAINTENANCE 
This document will be updated as requested and as pertinent information becomes 
available. Cyber incidences that occur during the year will be identified, compiled, and 
documented in future revisions via a process similar to that followed in this analysis. Comments 
received on this report, independent of origin but including members of the control system 
community, the public, the General Accounting Office, and DHS, will also be incorporated. 
These comments will be analyzed and evaluated with a recommendation for incorporation into 
future risk analysis and modeling efforts, where appropriate.
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SUMMARY 
The incidents reviewed to date suggest that the risk to national infrastructure is real but 
very low at present. Even so, the number per year is increasing, and the trends appear similar to 
what is being experienced in the IT world. Although the reported number of incidences is low, 
discussions with industry experts suggest that the actual number of incidents is at least a factor of 
10 higher, but these incidents are not reported beyond the companies which have experienced 
them. Furthermore, the economic losses from cyber attack on control systems remains low, 
rarely exceeding $1 million. 
The significant discrepancy between the control system experience and the IT experience 
(tens versus hundreds of thousands of incidents per year) is because terrorists have not yet found 
control system attacks a useful tool. In fact, the MIPT database of international terrorism has yet 
to record a single incident of cyber attack on a critical infrastructure control system that results in 
significant damage. There are a number of factors believed to cause this, including: 
x The still prevalent use of “legacy” control systems with their own proprietary software and 
information exchange protocols;  
x In the IT world the data being sought, such as personal identification numbers, has 
immediate value in financial theft or scams whereas in control systems the data is of no 
real value without understanding the process; 
x High hazard processes being controlled by electronic control systems typically have 
redundant, non-cyber safety systems; 
x Taking advantage of hacking into a control system requires detailed technical knowledge 
of the process to cause significant damage; and 
x Terrorists, domestic or foreign can achieve greater immediate bang for the buck with fire, 
crashes, or explosives. 
The above observation is similar to that by Gabriel Weimann.11 These observations are 
also consistent with the fact that the most prevalent incident is related to a current or former 
employee.  
Even though the incident rate is too low to allow statistically valid trend analysis, it does 
appear that the incident rate is rising exponentially. As the hacker and terrorist community 
increases in size and becomes more skilled, and as other avenues of terrorist attack are 
increasingly closed, it is reasonable to expect that significant cyber attacks will become more a 
inviting attack opportunity. Other appealing features of cyber attacks are the low investment 
cost, the potential for greater attack frequencies, and the ability to remotely conduct attacks and 
the lack of attribution (almost automatic anonymity). Though it may take terrorists a year to plan 
and execute a plane crash or a 40-ton explosive attack, the ease of conducting cyber attacks can 
increase the attack rate from a few per year across the nation to greater than 1x1010 per year, 
depending on the expertise, resources, and motivation of potential attack agents.  
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The higher the degree of interconnectivity and communication among cyber systems, the 
greater is the opportunity for talented people to breach the security systems and maliciously 
manipulate information or control system functions. We also anticipate this interconnectivity and 
communication capability to increase in control systems, at least for the foreseeable future. 
While access to information available to operators and executives (or denial of access to this 
information to those who legitimately need it (a denial-of-service attack) may cost industry 
money or result in embarrassment, the manipulation of system functions using this information 
can have more far-reaching consequences. An individual gaining unauthorized access to systems 
could potentially act as an operator and affect systems in ways that injure people, damage 
facilities, and shut down segments of the infrastructure, with the potential of to cascading into 
regional and even national disasters. Currently, we are not collecting data in such a way that it 
would provide DHS and industry the technical basis for characterizing and quantifying the 
human -system response to attack. To do so would allow us to identify and correct vulnerabilities 
thus making the perpetrator’s job more difficult. 
Finally, the most immediate need in the arena of incident tracking is a more effective way 
of reporting all, or all significant and most other cyber attacks on control systems. This enhanced 
reporting system needs to be a joint venture between industry and government. The CSSC has 
tasks planned for FY 2006 that will go a long way towards achieving that goal.
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Appendix A 
Glossary
audit or pen test. A intentional intrusion into a computer system to assess security vulnerabilities and 
identify potential opportunities to penetrate the system (e.g., security codes, firewalls, passwords, 
etc.)
attack. An intentional violation of a security objective. Attacks may either be initiated by persons outside 
the plant or by insiders. We distinguish between targeted and untargeted attacks.
cyber security incident. Any adverse event that threatens the confidentiality, integrity or accessibility of 
an agency’s information resources. Includes but are not limited to: attempts (either failed or 
successful) to gain unauthorized access to a system or its data; disruption or denial of service;
unauthorized use of a system for the transmission, processing or storage of data; changes to system 
hardware, firmware or software without the agency’s knowledge, instruction or consent; attempts 
to cause failures in critical infrastructure services or loss of critical supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems; attempts to cause failures that may cause loss of life or significant 
impact on the health or economic security of the agency and/or State; probing of any nature that an 
agency or other authorized entity has not approved in advance for system security testing 
purposes.1
denial of service (DoS). Attacks that adversely affect or degrade access to critical servers or attempted 
attacks, particularly if they are persistent or significant such as those aimed specifically at an 
agency’s routers or critical servers. DOS is an attack where the goal of the attacker is to decrease 
the availability of the system. 
hack. A targeted attack against a specific system; because the attacker is going after a specific system, a 
great deal more technical expertise is required because multiple exploits are typically used and 
continued control of the host is desired, which means covert communication channels have to be 
established (typically how hacked systems are identified) and must be good enough to bypass 
multiple detection mechanisms. 
hacker. A person who deliberately targets a system , with a specific network or group of networks for a 
particular reason; a good hacker is much better technically than a virus/worm writer (mobile 
malware); hackers require enough technical expertise to be able to modify existing exploits, 
develop custom code specific to the target environment, etc. during an attack.  
human reliability analysis (HRA). HRA is the probabilistic calculation of “…unwanted actions or 
inactions that arise from problems in sequencing, timing, knowledge, human-system interface, 
procedures, or work processes that result in deviations from standards or norms that place people, 
equipment, or systems at risk.”2
malware authors. A person whom writes programs to obtain information from identified sources. Good 
malware writers can get paid extremely well, better even than white hat security experts for writing 
good code; professionals who depend on their reputation for high-quality, technically innovative 
code.
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malware or spyware. Malware are programs, certain types of which are illegal, that gather information for 
a variety of purposes but are not considered ethical by most people. This includes information 
gathering for marketing, spam mailing, harvesting information for identity theft or other financial 
crimes, and turning vulnerable personal computers into drones in botnets that are rented out to 
people who need lots of bandwidth. Spyware is non-mobile malware and is some of the best-
written code in industry; untargeted attacks.  
misconfiguration. Incident wherein a user has misconfigured a computer system by omitting required 
passwords, network firewalls, etc. to inadvertently create a vulnerability. 
mobile malware. Worms and viruses—the form of attack most people are familiar with; generally 
untargeted; their purpose is to spread as rapidly as possible; may include a backdoor for use as in a 
botnet later, but generally the backdoors are detected by anti-virus software and removed. 
Generally takes advantage of one known exploit to infect a host; one or two means of propagating 
and one or two backdoors for later use by the writer.  
Spyware. See malware, above.
targeted attack.An attack intended to harm a specific communication system or type of system, such as 
for purposes of industrial espionage, warfare, or terrorism. Targeted attacks are typically preceded 
by a phase of gathering information about the target, such as using online and offline available 
references, as well as dedicated tools for discovering vulnerable systems on a network.3
Trojan. A virus where the malicious functionality is hidden behind functionality that is desired and used 
by the user. Trojans are typically employed to circumvent confidentiality or access control
objectives.
unauthorized access. An attempt to gain access to someone else electronic domain, control system, 
computer, etc. Successful unauthorized access to agency systems can result in Website 
defacements, unauthorized root/administrator access, etc. Persistent unsuccessful attempts can 
cause a system to lock out accounts due to brute force password attacks, response problems 
because an automated script keeps probing a Web server, etc. 
Untargeted attack. An attack that victimizes any vulnerable system discovered.
virus attack. An attack with a virus that manipulates a legitimate user to bypass authentication and access 
control mechanisms in order to execute the malicious code injected by the attacker. In practice, 
virus attacks are often untargeted and spread among vulnerable systems and users. Virus attacks 
often directly or indirectly decrease the availability of infected systems by consuming excessive 
amounts of processing power or network bandwidth. 
worm. A malicious code whose propagation mechanisms rely on automatic exploration and exploitation 
of vulnerabilities in the targeted system, without involvement of any user. Worm infections are 
untargeted and usually create availability problems for the affected systems or even the Internet as 
a whole.4 In addition, the worm may carry malicious code to launch a distributed, targeted attack 
from all the infected hosts. 
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Appendix B 
Selected Cyber Case Studies 
Twelve of the 120 incidents reviewed under this task are presented here as case studies. 
1.  The Salt River Project Hack – ISID No. 1 
Between July 8th and August 31st, 1994, Lane Jarrett Davis gained unauthorized access to 
the Salt River Project (SRP) computer network via a dialup modem so he could have access to 
billing information. He installed a back door into the system giving him access at a later time. At 
the time, SRP’s water SCADA system operated a 131-mile canal system, which was used to 
deliver water to customers in the Phoenix metropolitan area. Mr. Davis had at least one 5-hour 
session on mission critical systems which controlled the canals. Data vulnerable during the 
intrusions included water and power monitoring and delivery, financial, and customer and 
personal information. Data taken and/or altered included login and password files, computer 
system log files, and “root” privileges. Furthermore, a Doppler-radar research project between 
the SRP and National Weather Service’s National Severe Storms Lab was also accessed. SRP 
estimated losses at $40,000, not including lost productivity due to the compromise. 
Mr. Davis was a member of a group that met regularly to share information on computer 
hacking and telephone fraud. In one instance he reprogrammed a PBX (telephone switch) to 
allow a previously inactive extension to receive incoming calls, obtain a dial tone, and make 
outgoing calls at the expense of the victim. A search to arrest produced numerous items 
including burglary tools, and a “Red Box” (a device that emulates the tones produced by coins 
inserted into a pay phone). He was actively involved in hacking into many other business and 
government systems including: U.S. West, Motorola, Arizona State University, AT&T, Glendale 
Community College, Evergreen Communications, U.S. Geographical Survey at Northern 
Arizona University, and the Internal Revenue Service Bulletin Board System. 
This hack is often linked to an attack on the Roosevelt Dam and has become technological 
myth which regularly resurfaces. Quoting a statement made before the U.S. House of 
Representatives, “a juvenile hacker gained unauthorized access to the companies controlling the 
operations of the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona.” At the time of this incident, Mr. Davis was 
27 years old and there was no connection between the SRP and Roosevelt Dam. 
One final note, the reward for his activities were bragging rights and the intellectual 
challenge. At the time of the incident, Mr. Davis was a programmer and software developer for 
Unique Software. He left in February 1996 for a better job prospect at Quest USA where he 
worked as a network and software developer until their going out of business. He was employed 
with Genuity, a large Internet Service Provider, at the time of his sentencing in 1997 and 
reported that he comes and goes as he pleases and makes his own schedules. Mr. Davis has an 
associate’s degree in computer science and believed that he had the right to pursue his 
intellectual freedom through his hacking activities. 
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2.  Reverse Osmosis System PLC Attacked – ISID No. 29 
A programmable logic controller (PLC) used to control a reverse-osmosis water 
purification system at a semiconductor manufacturer was shutdown when an individual or group 
gained unauthorized access through the Internet. Due to its location in the plant, the PLC had 
been connected to a non-process control network that allowed Internet traffic. There was no 
impact on production as there were sufficient backup water supplies. 
3.  Siberian Gas Pipeline Explosion – ISID No. 32 
A Russian Gas Pipeline was disrupted causing an undisclosed dollar amount of damage 
created by an explosion with the power of a three kiloton nuclear weapon. Gas supplies were 
disrupted and consequential foreign currency earnings. An external-Agency of Foreign States, 
hired engineering firms to design defects into the technologies and products perpetrating the 
controls utilizing software that included a Trojan Horse that caused a major explosion of the 
Trans-Siberian pipeline in June of 1982. The Trojan ran during a pressure test on the pipeline but 
doubled the usual causing the explosion.
4.  Navy Radar Shuts Down SCADA Systems – ISID No. 37 
During a military exercise a naval radar system caused severe electromagnetic interference 
with the SCADA system of a nearby water authority and gas and electric company. Both the 
water authority and gas and electric company were unable to remotely actuate critical valve 
openings and closings, and technicians had to be dispatched to effected remote locations to 
manually open and close water and gas valves as a result. In both cases, the points of intrusion 
were wireless networks. Although this incident was accidental, it effectively resulted in a denial-
of-service.
This incident illustrates the susceptibility of wireless networks to an external attack and the 
paramount importance that data integrity represents to operational SCADA systems. The 
financial impact of this incident is unknown; however, it is clear that there was loss of staff time 
and equipment control. 
5.  Hackers Crash Controller via Web Service – ISID No. 38 
From December 2002 to January 2003, a hacker or group of hackers gained unauthorized 
access to a modular hybrid controller resulting in a denial of service and loss of equipment 
control.
There were two things happening at the same time. First, hackers were opening 
connections, sending unknown messages and then leaving without closing the connection. After 
repeated attacks, all connections were consumed resulting in a denial of service to legitimate 
users on the Ethernet port. Second, hackers sent a Web page to the controller containing Java 
script and the text: “Hello! Welcome to http://worm.com Hacked by Chinese.” This exposed a 
bug in the TCP/IP stack causing the controller to reset forcing all outputs to their off state. 
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Two controller vendor engineers worked full-time on the problem for three to four weeks 
each. Network activity was captured with a network analyzer and once the causes were 
identified, the fixes were relatively easy. First, the controller’s software was modified to properly 
close all timeout connections. Second, the vendor of the TCP/IP stack software used in the 
controller was informed and provided a fix for the stack. 
This incident clearly shows the risk of Web services being deployed directly on industrial 
controllers, a common practice on most remote terminal units (RTUs), programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), and distributed collector systems (DCSs) sold today. According to a major 
manufacture of PLCs,d the vast majority of their products are ordered with Web services enabled, 
particularly on their premium brands. However, a study by the same companies marketing team 
indicated that only 13% of the users of these PLCs actually configured and used the Web 
services. The remaining customers left the Web servers in the PLCs active with default 
passwords deployed.
6.  Slammer Infected Laptop Shuts Down DCS – ISID No. 41 
In May 2003, a corporate employee installed software on a laptop, unaware that it included 
an unpatched version of Microsoft SQL. Sometime later, the user connected the laptop to the 
Internet (in violation of company policy) to access email via an Internet service provider. The 
SQL-slammer worm infected the Internet connected machine. The user then brought the infected 
machine into the office and connected to the network, causing a small outbreak of the SQL-
slammer worm within the corporate network and process network. 
A data acquisition server without a firewall, a control system, and a development control 
system became infected with the worm and had to be removed from the control network to 
prevent further infection. There was no significant impact to production, but some history data 
was lost during server down-time and had to be manually created. 
7.  Nachi Worm on Advanced Process Control Servers – ISID No. 51 
In December 2003, eight advanced process control servers in a petrochemical company 
were affected by the Nachi virus, resulting in a loss of production for about 5 hours. The 
advanced process control servers running Windows 2000 had to be disconnected from the 
network until the virus could be removed from the machines. 
8.  Two Viruses Cause Near Miss – ISID No. 66 
A major petroleum company experienced a serious near miss when two worms—the 
nb_worm and SQL-slammer—affected many of the servers on their process control network. 
The impact of this incident included server and communications failures throughout the system 
from the wells and manifolds to the floating production offshore platform. The process control 
system was kept functional during the entire process of identifying and resolving the problem. 
d. The name of this vendor is withheld by request. 
34
The perpetrator and point-of-entry are unknown. The financial impact was estimated to be 
between $10,000 and $100,000, and there was a significant loss of staff time 
9.  Backdoor Trojan Attack on Manufacturing Lab – ISID No. 75 
This incident describes a complex and wide-reaching malware-based attack against the 
manufacturing lab systems of a major electronics manufacturer. The lab was a large integrated 
test and development facility with a significant number of Windows servers and development 
machines spread over several building sites. The attack was a back-door Trojan, which was at 
that time, a new and unknown variant. It is unknown whether this was a directed attack or not, 
and the intent of the attack is unknown. 
Initially, it appeared that only one server had been infected and then cleaned automatically 
by its antivirus software. Inspection of the antivirus logs on this server indicated that the virus 
had been deleted. Unfortunately, later investigation proved that the virus had created a file 
named administrator.txt which contained a list of IP addresses for all the lab machines, along 
with all of the account names for each machine recorded, and the password for that account. 
Many of the accounts that were recorded were local administrator accounts with blank passwords 
or passwords consisting of the phrase “password.” The virus had configured an ftp server and 
was sending this information to an unknown location. The server was disconnected and the 
administrator.txt file was printed. 
Another server was experiencing similar problems and a decision was made to disconnect 
this server from the network as it most likely had a virus, but the users refused, as they couldn’t 
spare the down time. Consequently management was asked to disconnect the infected lab 
machines which would result in decreased production and therefore cost money. In a few short 
hours, at least half of the lab machines were discovered to be infected and were disconnected 
from the network, resulting in production stoppages. 
From here, the issue was escalated and corporate entities were contacted to share 
information. The corporate network and desktop support venders were informed of the situation 
and a call was made to the organization’s network security. A representative at the anti-virus 
software vendor was also contacted. The problem was considered contained by the end of the 
day but not solved. Almost a week went by and there was a desperate need for an immediate 
solution. The engineers decided to invoke the equivalent of a mutiny by reconfiguring the test 
beds with the machines hooked to hubs and switches for connectivity. There was no access to 
DNS servers, no communication process and no documentation for changing the many 
embedded passwords. There was no official fix yet available and some valuable resources were 
not properly backed up. Ultimately, users were helped with work-arounds until the network and 
all related resources were up and running. All-in-all, about 3 weeks of development time and 
countless other related hours were lost, although the actual number is unknown. 
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10.  European Distribution SCADA – KEMA No. 1 
A European utility connected their distribution SCADA system to the corporate network. 
They did not deploy the Microsoft security patch for Welchia nor upgrade their anti-virus 
software before the virus hit. In addition, the CISCO router had older software that did not 
include Quality-of-Service nor rate limiting applications. The distribution SCADA utilized 
shared corporate routers for communications. The virus entered through the corporate network 
and created a synflood attack on the router. This created a shutdown of 30–40% of all 
communication traffic from the distribution SCADA to the Control Center. Because there was no 
loss of power, the event was not noticeable to the outside world. If there was a loss of power 
while the SCADA communications were impacted, it could have had serious impacts on utility 
operations and customer response. The attack was initially construed as a hardware problem for 
the first 24 hours until a senior IT security officer identified the problem as a virus.  
Even though there was no loss of power, the utility expended approximately 40 man-weeks 
(4 calendar weeks) cleaning-up the event. The utility lost significant distribution SCADA 
capability for three days (many distribution substations were not visible to the control center). 
Since there was no loss of power, there was no requirement for disclosure and the utility did not 
disclose this event. 
11.  European Hydro – KEMA No. 2 
A European utility with significant hydro resources encountered an event while attempting 
to reduce power from high power (approximately 70%) to zero in rapid manner during a safety 
analysis test. The hydro control system motor control utilized a Profibus network. When the 
request for load reduction was received at the motor, the set point appeared to be outside the 
accepted range. Consequently, the motor controller substituted the set point with a value from a 
local register within the motor.  
This misconfiguration created a conflict in valve operation where some valves were 
maintaining a high power operation and high water flow while others were attempting to reduce 
water flow. 
The result of the set point mismatch was that valves were slammed shut as a result of the 
force of the water flowing into the turbine. Instead of a slow and controlled shutdown of the 
water flow the flow was reduced over 70% within a second creating a vacuum bubble within the 
turbine.  
There was no physical damage to the power plant. But as a result of the problems 4 other 
plants using the same Profibus-motor control network were shutdown for about two weeks. 
It took almost a week before the software was released but only a couple of minutes to find 
what were wrong with it. Installation of the new software took about a week. 
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12.  Educational Case Study – LLNL No. 1 
The attached case study, Backdoors and Holes in Network Perimeters, was prepared by 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) for CSSC. This is a fictionalized case based 
on several actual cyber attack incidents, recreated specifically to educate owners of similar 
systems on potential cyber attacks and means of enhancing cyber security to minimize the 
probability of attack in the future. The incidents were fictionalized to provide anonymity to those 
critical infrastructure facilities, which were impacted by cyber attack. 
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